

Witness CCS – 5 R Dismukes Cost of Service/Rate Design

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of)	Docket No. 07-057-13
Questar Gas Company to Increase)	Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony of
Distribution Non-Gas Rates and)	David E. Dismukes, Ph.D.
Charges and Make Tariff)	For the Committee of
Modifications)	Consumer Services

September 22, 2008

1 **Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS**
2 **ADDRESS?**

3 A. My name is David E. Dismukes and I am a Consulting Economist with the
4 Acadian Consulting Group. My business address is 6455 Overton Street,
5 Baton Rouge, Louisiana. I am the same person that filed direct testimony
6 on the behalf of the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (“CCS” or “the
7 Committee”) on August 18, 2008.

8 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

9 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to some of the issues
10 addressed in the direct testimony of the Division of Public Utilities (“DPU”
11 or “the Division”), the Utah Association of Energy Users Intervention
12 Group (“UAE”), and the American Association of Retired Persons
13 (“AARP”), the Salt Lake Community Action Program (“SLCAP”), and the
14 Crossroads Urban Center (“CUC”) (collectively, “the Joint Intervenors”). In
15 particular:

- 16 • The proper cost allocation factor for small diameter mains, service
17 lines, and meters and regulators. (Direct Testimony of Mr. Glen
18 Gregory for the Division and Mr. Kevin Higgins for UAE).
- 19 • The proper cost allocation factor for feeder lines, compression,
20 regulation, and measurement (Direct Testimony of Mr. Glen Gregory
21 for the Division and Mr. Kevin Higgins for UAE).
- 22 • The proper revenue allocation factors for classes excluded from
23 Questar Gas Company’s (“Questar,” or “the Company”) class cost of

24 service study (“CCOS”) (Direct Testimony of Mr. Kevin Higgins for
25 UAE).

26 • The rate design proposals and analysis offered by the Joint Intervenors
27 (Direct Testimony of Dr. Charles Johnson).

28 • The rate design proposals offered by the Division (Direct Testimony of
29 Mr. Glen Gregory).

30 **Q. HOW IS YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

31 A. After providing a summary of my recommendations and overview, my
32 rebuttal testimony will address each of the specific rebuttal topics I
33 previously mentioned.

34 **II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

35 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS**
36 **PROCEEDING?**

37 A. I recommend that the Commission adopt the CCOS and rate design
38 recommendations that I offered in my direct testimony filed on August 18,
39 2008. There are only a handful of areas where I have disagreements with
40 other parties and even then, the disagreements are primarily based upon
41 specific details and not overall conceptual differences of opinion. There
42 are, however, significant rate implications for each of these specific
43 differences and, on balance, I believe that my recommendations should be
44 preferred since they are (a) based upon prior Commission precedent
45 and/or (b) consistent with other areas of the Company’s operations,
46 policies, or prior rate case filings. For instance:

- 47 • The Commission should accept my recommended cost allocation
48 factor for small diameter mains since the recommendation is consistent
49 with the Company's policies for line extensions.
- 50 • The Commission should accept my recommended cost allocation
51 factor for feeder mains, regulation and measurement since the method
52 is consistent with past Commission policy, within the boundaries that
53 were examined in the Commission-created Rate Design Working
54 Groups, and consistent with the Company's proposals in its last rate
55 case.
- 56 • The Commission should accept my recommended revenue allocation
57 factor for omitted classes since it represents a better means of
58 matching costs and revenues.
- 59 • The Commission should accept my rate design recommendation which
60 would preserve the current basic service fee ("BSF") rates and start the
61 process of critically examining a number of important rate structure
62 issues including block rates and seasonal differentials. Rate design
63 can be a powerful, and relatively cost-effective tool for the Commission
64 to utilize in its ongoing initiatives on natural gas end use efficiency.
65 Maintaining many elements of the Company's current rate design, like
66 large seasonal differentials and declining block rates, are simply
67 inconsistent with the Commission's decisions in the Company's prior
68 demand-side management ("DSM") proceedings and those associated
69 with the Conservation Enabling Tariff ("CET").

70 **III. OVERVIEW OF POSITIONS**

71 **Q. BEFORE DISCUSSING EACH OF YOUR REBUTTAL POINTS, CAN**
72 **YOU PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF WHERE YOU THINK THERE IS**
73 **GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS**
74 **AND THOSE OFFERED BY THE INTERVENING PARTIES' IN THEIR**
75 **DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

76 A. Yes. There are a number of areas where there is close agreement
77 between my testimony and those of the other intervening parties,
78 particularly the Division and the Joint Intervenors. For instance, the
79 recommendations I offered are similar in many ways to:

80 • The Division and the Joint Intervenors' criticisms about the overall
81 adequacy of the Company's CCOS approach. In particular, the
82 Company's methodology that examines the CCOS only from the
83 perspective of the proposed classes, and not from the prior set of rate
84 schedules and classes.

85 • The Division and the Joint Intervenors' position that no customer class
86 should be excluded from the CCOS without some well-proven
87 justification.

88 • UAE and the Division's position about certain cost allocation factors
89 that were utilized by the Company. In particular, I discuss the allocation
90 factor used to distribute the cost of small distribution mains and the
91 allocation factor used for feeder mains, compression, regulation and
92 measurement equipment.

- 93 • UAE’s disagreement with the Company’s proposed revenue allocation
94 factor utilized for the classes omitted in the CCOS.
- 95 • The Division and the Joint Intervenors’ rejection of the Company’s
96 proposed increase to the BSF.
- 97 • The Division and the Joint Intervenors’ position that the Company’s
98 GS-R and GS-C should consider moving away from a tax-based
99 classification to one that rests more on usage characteristics.

100 **Q. WHERE ARE THEIR DISAGREEMENTS?**

101 A. As I indicated earlier, there are four primary and important areas of
102 disagreement between my recommendations and those of the Division
103 and/or UAE including:

- 104 • The Division has offered an alternative cost allocation factor for small
105 diameter mains. In theory, we both agree that there are both customer
106 and throughput functions which influence the development of these
107 types of investments, and while my 75/25 percent distribution plant
108 factor study (“DPFS”)/throughput allocation factor appears close to the
109 Division’s 80/20 proposal, there are important differences particularly in
110 the “sub-allocation” of the 20 percent component.
- 111 • The Division and UAE have offered alternative cost allocation factors
112 for feeder mains, compression, regulation and measurement that place
113 considerably heavier weight on the capacity component that my

114 recommendation and are, in fact, higher than the Company's original
115 proposal.

116 • UAE and I both agree that the Company's revenue allocation factor for
117 the classes omitted for the CCOS could be improved and have offered
118 alternative allocators.

119 • The Division is supporting a seasonal differential and declining block
120 rate structure that is not based upon any evidence, is potentially
121 discriminatory, and is inconsistent with the Commission's policies over
122 the past two years attempting to support energy efficiency and
123 conservation.

124 **IV. COST ALLOCATION FACTOR – SMALL DISTRIBUTION MAINS**

125 **Q. LET'S TURN TO YOUR FIRST REBUTTAL POINT. CAN YOU**
126 **SUMMARIZE THE DIVISION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COST**
127 **ALLOCATION FACTOR FOR SMALL DISTRIBUTION MAINS, SERVICE**
128 **LINES, REGULATORS AND METERS?**

129 A. Yes. The Division recommends that the Commission recognize that each
130 of the afore-referenced investments are influenced by both customer and
131 usage considerations. Like my recommendation, the Division
132 recommends that a significant share of these costs (80 percent) be
133 allocated according to the customer-oriented approach developed by the
134 Company in its Distribution Plant Factor Study ("DPFS"). My
135 recommendation was slightly lower requesting the Commission utilize a
136 factor that is comprised of 75 percent of the Company's DPFS measure.

137 Q. **HOW DID THE DIVISION RECOMMEND THE REMAINING**
138 **INVESTMENT BE ALLOCATED?**

139 A. The Division recommends that the remaining 20 percent of the small
140 diameter distribution main investment be allocated on a composite
141 capacity/throughput factor which itself is split on an 80 percent demand/20
142 percent throughput basis. My recommendation was that my remaining
143 share (25 percent) be allocated on a throughput basis only.

144 Q. **DO YOU AGREE WITH THE DIVISION'S RECOMMENDATION?**

145 A. I do agree with the recommendation that a relatively large share of these
146 costs should be allocated on a customer-oriented basis. I disagree,
147 however, with the Division's recommendation that the remaining shares be
148 allocated on a blended throughput and capacity measure. My
149 recommendation was that these costs be allocated on throughput only.

150 Q. **WHY SHOULD THE COMMISSION NOT ADOPT THE DIVISION'S**
151 **RECOMMENDATION?**

152 A. Distribution mains and their associated supporting equipment are usually
153 associated with moving gas volumes and distribution level throughput to
154 customers, particularly smaller customers. As I noted in my direct
155 testimony, the Company's own distribution main extension policy utilizes
156 throughput as a measure for determining the appropriate level of customer
157 investment support. This policy does not utilize capacity as an influencing
158 consideration. I recommend the Commission recognize this in

159 determining the appropriate distribution main allocation factor and utilize a
160 75/25 percent DPFS/distribution throughput factors.

161 **V. COST ALLOCATION FACTOR – FEEDER MAINS, COMPRESSION,**
162 **REGULATION, AND MEASUREMENT**

163 **Q. LET’S TURN TO YOUR SECOND REBUTTAL POINT. CAN YOU**
164 **DESCRIBE THE DIVISION AND UAE’S PROPOSED COST**
165 **ALLOCATION FACTOR FOR FEEDER MAINS, COMPRESSION,**
166 **METERS AND MEASUREMENT?**

167 A. Both the Division and UAE have offered alternative recommendations for
168 the allocation of large diameter mains (feeder mains) and compression.
169 My recommendations, the Division’s, UAE’s and the Company’s all
170 recognize that there are both capacity and throughput considerations that
171 should be incorporated into the allocation factor for these investments.
172 The Division, however, proposes to allocate these costs on a 80-20 peak-
173 throughput basis. UAE recommends these costs be allocated on system
174 load factor consistent with a Peak and Average method. This results in an
175 effective 75-25 peak-throughput allocation. Recall the Company’s
176 proposed allocation was 60-40 percent peak-throughput. My
177 recommendation was a 50-50 peak-throughput allocation factor.

178 **Q. WHY SHOULD THE COMMISSION NOT ADOPT THE DIVISION’S**
179 **RECOMMENDATION?**

180 A There is simply no basis for supporting the Division’s recommendation.
181 While my direct testimony noted that cost allocations often included a

182 considerable degree of subjectivity, the Division's recommendations on
183 this cost allocation factor are not supported by any prior Commission
184 precedent, an alternative methodology, or empirical information. In fact,
185 as I noted in my direct testimony, in the Company's last rate case that did
186 not result in a settlement, the Commission established a weighting of 71
187 percent throughput and 29 percent peak: an allocation almost inversely
188 related to what the Division is now recommending in this proceeding.

189 **Q. WHAT ABOUT UAE'S RECOMMENDATION?**

190 A. I also disagree with UAE's recommendation. The Peak and Average
191 method has not been utilized in the past by the Commission, and the
192 effective allocation factors that result from this method are beyond what
193 was offered by the Company and represent the outer boundary of
194 allocation factors under consideration from the Rate Design Working
195 Group created after the Company's last rate case. As a result, the high
196 capacity weight included in this factor appears to be designed to place a
197 greater cost burden on smaller customer classes like residential and
198 commercial customers.

199 **VI. REVENUE ALLOCATION FACTOR**

200 **Q. LET'S TURN TO YOUR THIRD REBUTTAL POINT. HOW IS UAE**
201 **PROPOSING TO MODIFY THE COMPAY'S REVENUE ALLOCATION**
202 **FACTOR FOR THOSE CLASSES OMITTED FROM THE CCOS?**

203 A. UAE notes that the Company's method for allocating revenues from the
204 customer classes omitted from the CCOS are inappropriately matched

205 with the costs created by those respective classes. UAE, instead, offers
206 that these revenues be allocated across the remaining customer classes
207 on a 75-25 percent peak/throughput factor.

208 **Q. DO YOU DISAGREE WITH UAE?**

209 A I agree with UAE in principle but disagree with their alternative revenue
210 allocation factor. The cost of service factor I recommended in my direct
211 testimony would be more appropriate in allocating these revenues in a
212 fashion that follows the assignment of these classes' costs.

213 **VII. RATE DESIGN PROPOSALS**

214 **Q. LET'S TURN TO YOUR FOURTH REBUTTAL POINT. WOULD YOU**
215 **PLEASE DISCUSS THE DIVISION'S RATE DESIGN PROPOSALS?**

216 A. The Division has offered a number of rate design proposals that include:

- 217
- Rejecting the Company's proposed increase in the BSF.
 - Accept the Company's summer-winter differentials.
 - Adopt a two part tariff for transportation service customers with a
219 flat volumetric rate.
 - Approve the Company's proposed GS-R/GS-C split in this
221 proceeding with an eventual separate into a General Service
222 Commercial Regular (GSC-R) and General Service Commercial
223 Large (GS-L) class in the upcoming rate case.
- 224

- 225 • Accept flat volumetric rates for the proposed GS-R and IS rate
226 classes.
- 227 • Allow a relatively flatter, but still decreasing block rate structure for
228 the GS-C class.

229 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE DIVISION'S PROPOSALS?**

230 A. I agree with several of the Division's recommendations including the
231 rejection of the Company's proposed BSF increase and the recommended
232 movement of the GS class into a GSC-R and GSC-L class based upon
233 some threshold peak usage level. I disagree with the Division's
234 recommendation to accept the Company's proposed summer-winter
235 differential, as well as the Division's proposed GS-C declining block rate
236 structure.

237 **Q. HOW DO YOU THINK YOUR POSITIONS REGARDING THE**
238 **DIVISION'S RATE DESIGN PROPOSALS COMPARE TO WHAT HAS**
239 **BEEN PROPOSED BY THE JOINT INTERVENORS?**

240 A. My positions regarding the Division's recommendations would appear to
241 be consistent with the testimony offered by the Joint Intervenors. Their
242 testimony clearly rejects the Company's BSF proposal and appears to
243 support a GS class split based on usage rather than a tax classification.

244 **Q. WHY ARE YOU OPPOSED TO THE DIVISION'S SEASONAL**
245 **DIFFERENTIAL AND DECLINING BLOCK RATE PROPOSALS?**

246 A. I am opposed to these proposals for a variety of economic and policy
247 reasons. First, from an economic perspective, there is no cost-justification
248 for either the declining block rate structure nor the seasonal differentials
249 offered by the Company. In fact, the Division's proposal simply re-
250 sculpted (or "re-sloped") the proposal offered by the Company in its
251 application. There is no empirical support for the Division's block levels
252 and no support for the new slopes (or rates). Second, from a policy
253 perspective, the proposal to accept the Company's proposed seasonal
254 differentials and some modified version of its proposed declining block
255 rate structure, is simply based upon an outdated load-building rate design.
256 This type of rate design is inconsistent with the Commission's policy
257 direction over the past two years in the Company's DSM and CET
258 proceedings.

259 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER RATEMAKING POLICY CONCERNS?**

260 A. Yes. The Division's proposal is potentially discriminatory. The Division
261 would offer a set of discounts to one set of customers (commercial)
262 without offering similarly-situated customers comparable discounts other
263 than their tax classification. Large residential customers, for instance,
264 currently face a declining block rate structure under the current GS tariff,
265 but under the Division's proposal, those same large residential customers
266 would become ineligible for the same price discounts offered to
267 commercial customers utilizing the same level of usage. However, under
268 the Division's proposal, commercial customers with the same volumetric

269 use as large residential usage would continue to receive a discount.
270 Conceptually, this pricing discrimination would also be imposed upon
271 transportation customers under the Division's proposals since a uniform
272 volumetric rate has also been proposed for this new class as well.

273 **VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

274 **Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS?**

275 A. I recommend that the Commission adopt the CCOS and rate design
276 recommendations that I offered in my direct testimony filed on August 18,
277 2008 that include:

- 278 • The Commission should accept my recommended cost allocation
279 factor for small diameter mains since the recommendation is consistent
280 with the Company's policies for line extensions.
- 281 • The Commission should accept my recommended cost allocation
282 factor for feeder mains, regulation and measurement since the method
283 is consistent with past Commission policy, within the boundaries that
284 were examined in the Commission-created Rate Design Working
285 Groups, and consistent with the Company's proposals in its last rate
286 case.
- 287 • The Commission should accept my recommended revenue allocation
288 factor for omitted classes since it represents a better means of
289 matching costs and revenues.
- 290 • The Commission should accept my rate design recommendation which
291 would preserve the current basic service fee ("BSF") rates and start the

292 process of critically examining a number of important rate structure
293 issues including block rates and seasonal differentials. Rate design
294 can be a powerful, and relatively cost-effective tool for the Commission
295 to utilize in its ongoing initiatives on natural gas end use efficiency.
296 Maintaining many elements of the Company's current rate design, like
297 large seasonal differentials and declining block rates, are simply
298 inconsistent with the Commission's decisions in the Company's prior
299 demand-side management ("DSM") proceedings and those associated
300 with the Conservation Enabling Tariff ("CET").

301 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY PREFILED**
302 **ON SEPTEMBER 22, 2008?**

303 A. Yes, it does.